The Law and Economics of Insider Trading
| dc.contributor.author | Sensenbrenner, Frank J. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ryznar, Margaret | |
| dc.contributor.department | Robert H. McKinley School of Law | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-09T14:44:45Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-12-09T14:44:45Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-05 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Several recent high-profile insider trading losses have not stopped the federal government from aggressively prosecuting insider trading cases. The first of its kind, this law review article offers both a legal analysis and an empirical analysis that would aid the government in detecting and prosecuting insider trading. Specifically, this article finds that insider traders move prices more than non-insider trades of similar characteristics and insiders trade on high-volume days based on a dataset generated from SEC litigation releases. | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Final published version | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Sensenbrenner, F. J., & Ryznar, M. (2015). Law and Economics of Insider Trading, The. Wake Forest L. Rev., 50, 1155. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1805/11586 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | 10.2139/ssrn.2604013 | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Wake Forest Law Review | en_US |
| dc.rights | Publisher Policy | en_US |
| dc.source | Publisher | en_US |
| dc.subject | insider trading | en_US |
| dc.subject | white collar crime | en_US |
| dc.subject | SEC | en_US |
| dc.title | The Law and Economics of Insider Trading | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |