The Law and Economics of Insider Trading
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Date
2015-05
Language
English
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Abstract
Several recent high-profile insider trading losses have not stopped the federal government from aggressively prosecuting insider trading cases. The first of its kind, this law review article offers both a legal analysis and an empirical analysis that would aid the government in detecting and prosecuting insider trading. Specifically, this article finds that insider traders move prices more than non-insider trades of similar characteristics and insiders trade on high-volume days based on a dataset generated from SEC litigation releases.
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Sensenbrenner, F. J., & Ryznar, M. (2015). Law and Economics of Insider Trading, The. Wake Forest L. Rev., 50, 1155.
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Wake Forest Law Review
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Article
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Final published version