The Consequences of Limiting Shareholder Litigation: Evidence from Exclusive Forum Provisions

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2020-08
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English
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Elsevier
Abstract

In response to an explosion of shareholder litigation, many firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to courts in a firm's state of incorporation. This paper examines the consequences of a required venue for shareholder litigation. Delaware-incorporated companies experience significant increases in firm value around exogenous events that confirmed the use of a specified forum. Reduced legal costs and the designation of the domicile court as the sole forum to hear shareholder claims contribute to the increase in firm value. Overall, these findings suggest that a required venue for shareholder litigation benefits firms by eliminating multi-jurisdictional lawsuits and reducing the threat of claims with little merit.

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Wilson, J. I. (2020). The consequences of limiting shareholder litigation: Evidence from exclusive forum provisions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 64, 101712. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101712
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Journal of Corporate Finance
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