Financial Incentives and Truth-Telling: The Growth of Whistle-Blowing Legislation in the United States

Abstract

Although government efforts to encourage whistleblowers to come forward date back to 1778, the United States has enjoyed a conflicted history with respect to whistleblowers. While some commentators pillory Edward Snowden, some privacy rights advocates praise his actions. Perhaps reflecting these conflicting sentiments, current protections in the U.S. are a patchwork collection of industry-specific legislation. The current slate of legislation is largely the result of the confluence of recurring waves of media publicity exposing government fraud, the growth in government spending and involvement, and Congress’s attempts to respond to adverse publicity concerning government fraud. The succession of public crises running from Watergate to the wasteful spending in the Iraq War, to the collapse of the financial and securities industries have demonstrated that the government needs whistleblowers to help expose fraud and waste. As successive legislative attempts to extend whistleblower protections have demonstrated, reform “is usually precipitated by some crisis or new political movement that disrupts the preexisting status quo.”