Peirce’s Heuristic Conception of Fundamentality

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2024
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English
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Abstract

What are the signs that inform us that some theory, concept, or entity is fundamental? What is fundamentality? Is fundamentality foundational? This article delves into such questions through an examination of the writings of American philosopher Charles S. Peirce, arguably one of the most genuinely “fundamental” thinkers in history. After an introductory contextualization of the topic, a representative sample of eight distinct principles or conceptions that Peirce announced as essential or fundamental is drawn from a chronologically diverse collection of his papers to identify which characters emerge that seem to justify their fundamentality. The article then articulates ten general properties that seem to be essential to Peirce’s conception of fundamentality, all of which are especially pertinent to the research endeavor. It concludes that Peirce’s heuristic conception of fundamentality cannot be separated from his metaphysical conception of reality, which sets him apart from contemporary debate.

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De Tienne, A. (2024). La concepción heurística de fundamentalidad de Peirce. Nadja, Lo Inquietante En La Cultura, 21.
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Nadja, Lo Inquietante En La Cultura
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