Managing imperfect competition by pay for performance and reference pricing

dc.contributor.authorMak, Henry Y.
dc.contributor.departmentEconomics, School of Liberal Artsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-29T14:30:36Z
dc.date.available2018-08-29T14:30:36Z
dc.date.issued2018-01
dc.description.abstractI study a managed health service market where differentiated providers compete for consumers by choosing multiple service qualities, and where copayments that consumers pay and payments that providers receive for services are set by a payer. The optimal regulation scheme is two-sided. On the demand side, it justifies and clarifies value-based reference pricing. On the supply side, it prescribes pay for performance when consumers misperceive service benefits or providers have intrinsic quality incentives. The optimal bonuses are expressed in terms of demand elasticities, service technology, and provider characteristics. However, pay for performance may not outperform prospective payment when consumers are rational and providers are profit maximizing, or when one of the service qualities is not contractible.en_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.citationMak, H. Y. (2018). Managing imperfect competition by pay for performance and reference pricing. Journal of Health Economics, 57, 131–146. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.11.002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1805/17210
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionof10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.11.002en_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Health Economicsen_US
dc.rightsPublisher Policyen_US
dc.sourceAuthoren_US
dc.subjectmanaged competitionen_US
dc.subjectmultitaskingen_US
dc.subjectprospective paymenten_US
dc.titleManaging imperfect competition by pay for performance and reference pricingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Mak_2018_managing.pdf
Size:
269.18 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.99 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: