Administrative Policy for Stochastic Democracy

Abstract

Prior studies of stochastic democracy have compared it to other forms of governance, demonstrated how to scale up or scale down as population changes, and developed an algorithm for start-up on Day 1. Left unanswered is the administrative policy for regulating the statutes developed by the legislative bodies. As the aim of stochastic democracy is design of a corruption-resistance form of managing human affairs the implementation of the activities of the government must also be robust against undue influence, bribery, and abuse of power. Decision-makers in a stochastic democracy by design cannot be “career” politicians, however, the bureaucrats of the government agencies or departments or ministries are advantageously retained across the changes in the legislative bodies. This quality invites corruption, the answer to which cannot be simply to apply oversight or policing. In this paper is developed an integrated structure which supplants the Byzantine-derived corporate-style hierarchy. Seven principles are applied to the bureaucracy and their integration and practice described herein as administrative policy, the principles being: transparency of regulatory process; not-less-than time limits; disclosure of change proposers; inclusion of economic externalities; open debate and notices of intent; chairmanship and participant selection; and periodic but stochastic changes in the number of agencies at each level of governance. This latter enforces either consolidation or expansion, within high and low limits, the re-organization of which will shuffle the reporting structure of the regulatory bureaucracy and disrupt entrenched habits and possible corrupting schemes. When complementing the legislative functions this work rounds-out the formation of a corruption-resistant, scalable form of truly representative governance for space habitats and societies of arbitrary size.