Platonic Realism

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Date
2022
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American English
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Routledge
Abstract

In this chapter, I make the case for platonic realism, the thesis that there are properties that lack spatial locations. After criticizing the one-over-many argument for realism and Lewis's argument for realism, I endorse a modal argument that derives the existence of platonic properties from considerations involving necessary truth. I then defend this argument from various objections. Finally, I argue that epistemic considerations and considerations of parsimony favor a weak form of platonic realism on which there are platonic properties, but each property could have had an instance, and would have been located in its instances if it had any.

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Carmichael, C. (2022). Platonic realism. (Preprint). Forth coming in: Mauren, A., and Fisher, A., eds. Routledge Handbook of Properties.
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Routledge Handbook of Properties
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