Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments
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Date
2003
Language
American English
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Abstract
Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage two are 45% lower than in stage one. Repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions: stage one contributions decrease by around 7% per game. Finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct response method, which suggest that our results help explain behavior in the latter.
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