Local politics and police strength

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Date
2005-06
Language
American English
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Abstract

Numerous studies have explored variation in police employment across cities, usually focusing on public choice, conflict, or organizational explanations. Yet, few consider whether the local political context affects police employment. Recent research suggests that local politics affects criminal justice outcomes. Using insights from urban politics research, I develop testable hypotheses about the effects of local political arrangements on municipal police strength. WLS regression results suggest the value of considering local political context in models of police strength. Specifically, in a sample of 945 cities with 25,000 or more residents in 1990, net of other variables, cities with unreformed political systems (mayor‐council forms of government, district‐based city councils and partisan elections) had more police employees per 1,000 residents, and this effect varied by region. Additionally, the effect of minority populations and crime rates on police strength varied across municipal political contexts. Implications for theories of police strength are discussed.

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Stucky, T. D. (2005). Local politics and police strength. Justice quarterly, 22(2), 139-169. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07418820500088739
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