Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership
| dc.contributor.author | Liu, Ting | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ma, Ching-to Albert | |
| dc.contributor.author | Mak, Henry Y. | |
| dc.contributor.department | Economics, School of Liberal Arts | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-12-23T18:20:13Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-12-23T18:20:13Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-08 | |
| dc.description.abstract | A Principal has a set of projects, each having different benefit potentials, and each requiring a basic technology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from production, but have private information of their own motivation preferences and project potentials. Technology and time-input choices are experts’ private decisions. Experts form a Partnership, which designs a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to determine experts’ priority on technology choice. Using a linear cost-share contract that lets experts make minimum profits, the Principal implements the first best by delegating all decisions to the Partnership. | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's manuscript | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Liu, T., Albert Ma, C., & Mak, H. Y. (2018). Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 152, 296–313. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.05.003 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1805/21563 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.05.003 | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | en_US |
| dc.rights | Publisher Policy | en_US |
| dc.source | Author | en_US |
| dc.subject | motivated experts | en_US |
| dc.subject | principal | en_US |
| dc.subject | multiagent incentives | en_US |
| dc.title | Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |