Koinonia: verifiable e-voting with long-term privacy
dc.contributor.author | Ge, Huangyi | |
dc.contributor.author | Chau, Sze Yiu | |
dc.contributor.author | Gonsalves, Victor E. | |
dc.contributor.author | Liu, Huian | |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, Tianhao | |
dc.contributor.author | Zou, Xukai | |
dc.contributor.author | Li, Ninghui | |
dc.contributor.department | Computer and Information Science, School of Science | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-06T16:08:07Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-06T16:08:07Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.description.abstract | Despite years of research, many existing e-voting systems do not adequately protect voting privacy. In most cases, such systems only achieve "immediate privacy", that is, they only protect voting privacy against today's adversaries, but not against a future adversary, who may possess better attack technologies like new cryptanalysis algorithms and/or quantum computers. Previous attempts at providing long-term voting privacy (dubbed "everlasting privacy" in the literature) often require additional trusts in parties that do not need to be trusted for immediate privacy. In this paper, we present a framework of adversary models regarding e-voting systems, and analyze possible threats to voting privacy under each model. Based on our analysis, we argue that secret-sharing based voting protocols offer a more natural and elegant privacy-preserving solution than their encryption-based counterparts. We thus design and implement Koinonia, a voting system that provides long-term privacy against powerful adversaries and enables anyone to verify that each ballot is well-formed and the tallying is done correctly. Our experiments show that Koinonia protects voting privacy with a reasonable performance. | en_US |
dc.eprint.version | Author's manuscript | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Ge, H., Chau, S. Y., Gonsalves, V. E., Li, H., Wang, T., Zou, X., & Li, N. (2019). Koinonia: Verifiable e-voting with long-term privacy. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 270–285. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359789.3359804 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1805/24283 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | ACM | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | 10.1145/3359789.3359804 | en_US |
dc.relation.journal | Proceedings of the 35th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference | en_US |
dc.rights | Publisher Policy | en_US |
dc.source | Author | en_US |
dc.subject | privacy | en_US |
dc.subject | e-voting | en_US |
dc.subject | voting privacy | en_US |
dc.title | Koinonia: verifiable e-voting with long-term privacy | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |