Browsing by Subject "Peirce"

Now showing 1 - 6 of 6
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    4thness
    (2020) Mullen, Frank; Hull, Greg
    Charlie Gordon hung a box. It was mounted on the front of his house, next to the door, narrow and painted black and oddly proportioned, like a talisman, like a ovate refugee from Easter Island. He hung it there so deliveries of large, flat boxes could be put safely inside, protected from the weather in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, United States. They never did it though, the FedEx people, and UPS, the Postal Service. They always left them on the porch floor, under the box, in front of god and everyone, and this was a great annoyance to Charlie Gordon, the star of our show.
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    A Peircean Approach to the Umwelt
    (UNIL, 2022) De Tienne, André; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    The concept of Umwelt has become so significant in biosemiotics that one may wonder whether Peirce could conceivably have missed it within the broader logical and metaphysical context of his realist pragmaticist semiotic theory. This brief paper suggests that far from having missed it, Peirce tackled it front and center at a most fundamental level.
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    On the Genealogy of Meaning in Peirce's New List of Categories
    (Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, 2021) Dillabough, Ronald Joseph; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    Many scholars believe that “On a New List of Categories” is a metaphysical or transcendental deduction. This essay will argue that Peirce derives the categories by induction and validates their order by precision . The paper will then draw on Peirce’s early and mature writings to explain how the new way of listing the categories can serve as a genealogy of signification : how different types of terms, propositions, and arguments emerge in the process of reasoning as different types of signs. In this way, the genealogy of signification would then qualify as both a phenomenology of logic and a science of semiotics . Such a science of semiotics will have three types of comparison corresponding to the sign-relation in inference: namely, uniparance, diaparance, and comparance. Then, the three types of comparison will give rise to three types of relatives in different types of proposition: namely, competitors, disquiparance, and equivalence. Finally, the three types of relatives will give rise to the different types of signs corresponding to the different types of terms: namely, icons, indices, and symbols. With this classification, there is then an explanation of how the process of reasoning is a semiotic process with three forms of valid arguments: namely, hypothesis, induction, and deduction.
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    Peirce and Scientific Realism
    (2022-01) Tekin, Atmaca; de Waal, Cornelis; De Tienne, André; Lyons, Timothy D.
    Scientific realism and antirealism are two main views in the philosophy of science regarding the status of unobservable entities in science and whether we have good epistemic reasons to believe that our current successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Briefly, the former claims that our scientific theories are (approximately) true and unobservable entities these scientific theories postulate exist. On the other hand, the latter claims that we do not have good epistemic reasons to believe that our scientific theories are (approximately) true and that unobservable entities our scientific theories postulate exist. The scientific realism has two primary tenets, one axiological (i.e., science should seek truth) and the other epistemological (namely, our current successful theories are (approximately) true). In this thesis, the issue has been examined from standpoint of the account of Peirce’s philosophy of science, more accurately based on his understanding of reality, truth and basic idealism. In the first chapter, I outline the main points of the debate from the perspectives of both sides. In the second chapter, I give reasons why the scientific realists’ argument is not convincing. In the third chapter, I attempt to draw an accurate picture of the account of Peirce’s views on the nature of scientific theories. In the last chapter, I make a case for scientific realism from the Peircean account of philosophy of science. I have claimed why the current debate cannot be settled without accepting a kind of Peirce's basic idealism and his understanding of reality. I think both scientific realists and antirealists accept a kind of naïve realism. This is the main reason why it is not possible to settle the debate from their standpoints. In order to overcome this issue, I attempt to develop a more sophisticated realism based on Peirce’s understanding of reality, truth and basic idealism.
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    Peirce on the Symbolical Foundation of Personhood
    (Eidos, 2021-10) De Tienne, André; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    This paper discusses the semiotic and metaphysical framework within which Peirce elaborated a symbolical and dynamical conception of personhood. It exhibits the centrality of Peirce’s early conception of the “unity of consistency” along with its decentering advantages. It describes how this gave rise to a metaphysics of personhood that questions the singularity of individuals. It then conducts a semiotic study of the evolutive process across which something indeterminate evolves into something determinate that increasingly personifies itself following the logic of symbolization, taking into account two major types of indetermination: generality and vagueness. It then considers the kind of teleology at work within personification. It concludes that personhood so conceived is not restricted to only individual human beings, for the process of symbolization at work is not confined to a particular species-specific application.
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    A Peircean Critique of and Alternative to Intentionalism about Perceptual Experience
    (2007-02-05T15:50:40Z) Kruidenier, Daniel E.; Houser, Nathan
    My thesis is broadly construed this way: intentionalism, as a theory about perceptual experience, says that the intentional character of perceptual experience determines the phenomenological character of that experience. In some way, to be explained, phenomenology is determined by intentional content. I will show that intentionalism fails on two accounts. It fails to replace the sense-data theory as an explanation of the content of perceptual experience. It also fails to deal satisfactorily with the problem of perceptual illusion. I will then offer an alternative rooted in the perceptual theory of Charles Peirce. I believe his critical but common sense approach preserves the intuition of sense-data theory, that perception is primarily a relation between perceivers and objects. Peirce’s theory also provides a better solution to the problem of illusion.