A Peircean Critique of and Alternative to Intentionalism about Perceptual Experience

Abstract

My thesis is broadly construed this way: intentionalism, as a theory about perceptual experience, says that the intentional character of perceptual experience determines the phenomenological character of that experience. In some way, to be explained, phenomenology is determined by intentional content. I will show that intentionalism fails on two accounts. It fails to replace the sense-data theory as an explanation of the content of perceptual experience. It also fails to deal satisfactorily with the problem of perceptual illusion. I will then offer an alternative rooted in the perceptual theory of Charles Peirce. I believe his critical but common sense approach preserves the intuition of sense-data theory, that perception is primarily a relation between perceivers and objects. Peirce’s theory also provides a better solution to the problem of illusion.