Smart card fault attacks on public key and elliptic curve cryptography
dc.contributor.advisor | King, Brian | |
dc.contributor.author | Ling, Jie | |
dc.contributor.other | Lee, Sankook | |
dc.contributor.other | Salama, Paul | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-03-02T14:25:58Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-03-02T14:25:58Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.degree.date | 2014 | en_US |
dc.degree.discipline | Electrical & Computer Engineering | en |
dc.degree.grantor | Purdue University | en_US |
dc.degree.level | M.S.E.C.E. | en_US |
dc.description | Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Blömmer, Otto, and Seifert presented a fault attack on elliptic curve scalar multiplication called the Sign Change Attack, which causes a fault that changes the sign of the accumulation point. As the use of a sign bit for an extended integer is highly unlikely, this appears to be a highly selective manipulation of the key stream. In this thesis we describe two plausible fault attacks on a smart card implementation of elliptic curve cryptography. King and Wang designed a new attack called counter fault attack by attacking the scalar multiple of discrete-log cryptosystem. They then successfully generalize this approach to a family of attacks. By implementing King and Wang's scheme on RSA, we successfully attacked RSA keys for a variety of sizes. Further, we generalized the attack model to an attack on any implementation that uses NAF and wNAF key. | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1805/5967 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.7912/C2/2513 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.subject | Smart Card | en_US |
dc.subject | RSA | en_US |
dc.subject | ECC | en_US |
dc.subject | Fault Attack | en_US |
dc.subject | Smart Card Security | en_US |
dc.subject | Public Key | en_US |
dc.subject | NAF | en_US |
dc.subject | wNAF | en_US |
dc.subject | Counter Fault Attack | en_US |
dc.subject | Bit Flip Attack | en_US |
dc.subject | Doubling Attack | en_US |
dc.subject | Attack Simulation | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Smart cards -- Security measures -- Research -- Analysis | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Data encryption (Computer science) | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Curves, Elliptic -- Data processing | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Cryptography -- Mathematics | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Public key cryptography -- Research | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Public key infrastructure (Computer security) | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Data protection -- Research | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Computer engineering -- Research | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Coding theory | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Computer security | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Data structures (Computer science) | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Embedded computer systems | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Smart card industry | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Computer networks -- Security measures | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Computers -- Access control | en_US |
dc.title | Smart card fault attacks on public key and elliptic curve cryptography | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en |