Ergon and the Embryo

Abstract

Ethical considerations of the human embryo have involved heated dispute and seem always to result in the same interminable debate. A history of this debate, however, shows a shift in the language used to distinguish between degrees of moral status – while the debate once focused on the presence or absence of “human life,” now it is more likely to hear whether the qualifications for “personhood” have been met. In other words, any member of the human species may deserve some level of respect, but only the “persons” deserve full moral respect. This leaves open the possibility for a human being who is not actually a person – a “nonperson human being.”

As an answer to the question of exactly what kind of respect to give the human embryo, Aristotelian moral philosophy offers a unique perspective, one which is distinctive from the familiar debate. Aristotle’s concept of ergon, or function, is a key to understanding what is essential in any human being, because it reveals the importance of potentiality to our nature as rational beings. A philosophical view of function, combined with the data of modern embryology, makes the case that our proper function is the vital part of who we are as human beings, and that a disruption of human function constitutes a true harm. This thesis contrasts Aristotelian proper human function with the modern understanding of a “nonperson human being,” especially as articulated within the ethical theory of Peter Singer. This understanding of function, revealing the essence of human potential and linked with human development, offers a sort of “common-sense morality” response to modern views on personhood.