Is My Head a Person?
dc.contributor.author | Burke, Michael B. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-18T13:39:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-18T13:39:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | |
dc.description.abstract | It is hard to see why the head and other brain-containing parts of persons are not themselves persons, or at least thinking, conscious beings. Some theorists have sought to reconcile us to the existence of thinking person-parts. Others have sought ways to avoid them, but by radical theories that abandon the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. This paper offers a novel, conservative solution, one on which the heads and other brain-containing parts of persons do exist but are neither persons, thinkers, nor conscious beings. A much briefer statement of the solution is found in section 5 of Burke 2004. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons, 107-125. | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1805/8361 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Ontos Verlag. | en_US |
dc.subject | many thinkers problem | en_US |
dc.subject | problem of the many | en_US |
dc.subject | material constitution | en_US |
dc.subject | personal identity | en_US |
dc.title | Is My Head a Person? | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |