A Rationale from J.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause

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Date
1985
Language
American English
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Abstract

My purpose here is to defend a simple if unpopular thesis. I assume that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment has an appropriate range of applicability. The scope of the First Amendment should be determined by the broadest range of purposes or values that can coherently be thought to underlie the Free Speech Clause. Where free speech values are not significantly implicated by any given expression or conduct, the expression is not entitled to protection under the Free Speech Clause. The distinction between expression that is not protected and expression to be accorded limited free speech protection is often not difficult to recognize. When properly drawn, this distinction should expedite the sound resolution of many otherwise problematic free speech cases.

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1985 Supreme Court Review 149
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