Who are you calling normal!: the relationship between species function and health care justice

Abstract

For the past 2,000 years, the medical and philosophical communities have been unable to formulate a clear conception of function. Yet, I argue that this debate has become of central importance to Western bioethics due to the role the concept of function plays within emerging health care justice models, and more broadly, within the debate surrounding universal health care in the United States. My thesis focuses on the relationship between species function and health care justice. Specifically, my position is that any workable formulation of just health care that is justified from a Rawlsian or politically liberal perspective must utilize conceptions of normal species function that are as neutral and stable as possible. I conclude by showing that Larry Wright’s evolutionarily-based teleological account of function is the most neutral and stable account of function within the philosophical canon, and utilize two case studies – idiopathic short stature and obesity – to help illustrate the applicability of Wright’s account to liberal health care justice formulations.