Dion, Theon, and the Many-Thinkers Problem

Abstract

Dion is a full-bodied man. Theon is that part of him which consists of all of him except his left foot. What becomes of Dion and Theon when Dion’s left foot is amputated? Employing the doctrine of sortal essentialism, in Burke 1994 (J. Phil.) I defended a surprising position last defended by Chrysippus: that Dion survives while the seemingly unscathed Theon perishes. This paper defends that position against objections by Stone, Carter, Olson, and others. Most notably, I offer here a novel, conservative solution to the many-thinkers problem, a solution that enables us to accept the existence of brain-containing person-parts (such as the pre-amputation Theon) while denying that those person-parts are thinking, conscious beings.