'Too Big To Fail' States

dc.contributor.authorMagliocca, Gerard N.
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-23T14:30:51Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description.abstractThis Essay explores the constitutional implications of a threatened default by a large state. Much like the huge financial institutions that became distressed in 2008, a large state might well be deemed too big to fail. If that kind of state seeks a federal bailout, it would hold most of the cards in any negotiation because Congress lacks the power to compel a state to pay its debts. After outlining this hold-up issue, the Essay concludes by assessing some possible responses by Congress, such as invoking the Guarantee Clause or imposing future fiscal penalties under the Spending Clause.en_US
dc.description.embargoforeveren_US
dc.embargo.lift10000-01-01
dc.identifier.citationMagliocca, Gerard N. "'Too Big To Fail' States." Connecticut Law Review 43, no. 4 (2011): 1089-1095.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0010-6151
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1805/4321
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherConnecticut Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshState government bankruptcy -- United States
dc.subject.lcshFederal government -- United States
dc.title'Too Big To Fail' Statesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
ul.alternative.fulltexthttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1722926en_US
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