Browsing by Subject "scientific realism"

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Chess and Antirealism
    (Springer Nature, 2023-11) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    In this article, I make a novel argument for scientific antirealism. My argument is as follows: (1) the best human chess players would lose to the best computer chess programs; (2) if the best human chess players would lose to the best computer chess programs, then there is good reason to think that the best human chess players do not understand how to make winning moves; (3) if there is good reason to think that the best human chess players do not understand how to make winning moves, then there is good reason to think that the best human theories about unobservables are wrong; therefore, (4) there is good reason to think that the best human theories about unobservables are wrong. The article is divided into three sections. In the first, I outline the backdrop for my argument. In the second, I explain my argument. In the third, I consider some objections.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Modest Surrealism: An Explanation of “Success” in the Sciences
    (Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research, 2013-04-05) Herod, Eric
    The contemporary scientific realism debate centers around the realist’s claim that successful scientific theories are at least approximately true. Realists, such as Hilary Putnam justify this claim by arguing that it would be a miracle were our successful scientific theories not at least approximately true. Denying the possibility of miracles, the scientific realist must defend a theory’s approximate truth as the only possible explanation for its success. Anti-realist Bas van Fraassen responds to the realist’s argument by offering a Darwinian explanation for the success of scientific theories, an explanation that involves neither truth nor miracles: we have successful theories because we reject those that do not succeed. Realists object that – although van Fraassen’s alternative may explain why we have successful theories – it fails to explain why any particular theory is successful. Striking at realism from another direction, Larry Laudan offers a list of historically successful scientific theories that are not even approximately true. Faced with a list of such false yet successful theories, while nonetheless seeking an explanation for the success of particular theories, one is pressed to find some alternative explanation of success that does not appeal to a theory’s approximate truth. Timothy Lyons presents one such alternative explanation which he terms modest surrealism. In contrast with van Fraassen’s Darwinian explanation, modest surrealism is put forward as an explanation of the success of individual theories. It claims that the mechanisms postulated by the theory would, if actual, bring about all relevant phenomena observed and some yet to be observed at time t; and these phenomena are brought about by actual mechanisms in the world. I critically analyze modest surrealism, exploring its strengths and weaknesses against competing explanations. Doing so, I apply modest surrealism to a host of successful scientific theories, revealing its potential application to the sciences and their history.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    A Realistic Argument for Scientific Realism: How to be a Realist Without Really Knowing It
    (Springer, 2020) Kahn, Samuel; Lilly Family School of Philanthropy
    In this paper I provide a novel argument for scientific realism (SR). In contrast to most recent defenses of SR, my defense of SR does not rely on the no-miracles argument (NMA). Instead, I take a more unconventional approach: I focus on the different kinds of justification available to different individuals in relation to different kinds of propositions. I maintain that this alternative focus shows that most people are warranted in believing many propositions about unobservables. The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first, I rehearse the main moves in the recent debate about SR. In the second, I argue that the discussion in section one enables us to see that most of the arguments in the recent debate about SR mistake their target: instead of being about SR, they are about meta-SR. I argue that what I call the JJ-principle should be rejected and, further, that if the JJ-principle is rejected, then meta-SR may be cleaved from SR. This enables me to advance to a position I call thin realism in the third and final section of the paper.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Systematicity theory meets Socratic scientific realism: the systematic quest for truth
    (Springer, 2018) Lyons, Timothy D.; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    Systematicity theory—developed and articulated by Paul Hoyningen-Huene—and scientific realism constitute separate encompassing and empirical accounts of the nature of science. Standard scientific realism asserts the axiological thesis that science seeks truth and the epistemological thesis that we can justifiably believe our successful theories at least approximate that aim. By contrast, questions pertaining to truth are left “outside” systematicity theory’s “intended scope” (21); the scientific realism debate is “simply not” its “focus” (173). However, given the continued centrality of that debate in the general philosophy of science literature, and given that scientific realists also endeavor to provide an encompassing empirical account of science, I suggest that these two contemporary accounts have much to offer one another. Overlap for launching a discussion of their relations can be found in Nicholas Rescher’s work. Following through on a hint from Rescher, I embrace a non-epistemic, purely axiological scientific realism—what I have called, Socratic scientific realism. And, bracketing the realist’s epistemological thesis, I put forward the axiological tenet of scientific realism as a needed supplement to systematicity theory. There are two broad components to doing this. First, I seek to make clear that axiological realism and systematicity theory accord with one another. Toward that end, after addressing Hoyningen-Huene’s concerns about axiological analysis, I articulate a refined axiological realist meta-hypothesis: it is, in short, that the end toward which scientific inquiry is directed is an increase in a specific subclass of true claims. I then identify a key feature of scientific inquiry, not generally flagged explicitly, that I take to stand as shared terrain for the two empirical meta-hypotheses. And I argue that this feature can be informatively accounted for by my axiological meta-hypothesis. The second broad component goes beyond mere compatibility between the two positions: I argue that, in want of a systematic account of science, we are prompted to find an end toward which scientific inquiry is directed that is deeper than what systematicity theory offers. Specifically, I argue that my refined axiological realist meta-hypothesis is required to both explain and justify key dimensions of systematicity in science. To the quick question, what is it that the scientific enterprise is systematically doing? My quick answer is that it is systematically seeking to increase a particular subclass of true claims.