Browsing by Subject "problem of the many"

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    Dion, Theon, and the Many-Thinkers Problem
    (2004) Burke, Michael B.
    Dion is a full-bodied man. Theon is that part of him which consists of all of him except his left foot. What becomes of Dion and Theon when Dion’s left foot is amputated? Employing the doctrine of sortal essentialism, in Burke 1994 (J. Phil.) I defended a surprising position last defended by Chrysippus: that Dion survives while the seemingly unscathed Theon perishes. This paper defends that position against objections by Stone, Carter, Olson, and others. Most notably, I offer here a novel, conservative solution to the many-thinkers problem, a solution that enables us to accept the existence of brain-containing person-parts (such as the pre-amputation Theon) while denying that those person-parts are thinking, conscious beings.
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    Is My Head a Person?
    (Ontos Verlag., 2003) Burke, Michael B.
    It is hard to see why the head and other brain-containing parts of persons are not themselves persons, or at least thinking, conscious beings. Some theorists have sought to reconcile us to the existence of thinking person-parts. Others have sought ways to avoid them, but by radical theories that abandon the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. This paper offers a novel, conservative solution, one on which the heads and other brain-containing parts of persons do exist but are neither persons, thinkers, nor conscious beings. A much briefer statement of the solution is found in section 5 of Burke 2004.