Browsing by Subject "financial fraud"

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    External Corporate Governance and Financial Fraud: Cognitive Evaluation Theory Insights on Agency Theory Prescriptions
    (Wiley, 2017-06) Shi, Wei; Connelly, Brian L.; Hoskisson, Robert E.; School of Business
    Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance can impinge on top managers' feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers' likelihood of financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager's perspective and questions one of agency theory's foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers reduces the potential for moral hazard.