Browsing by Subject "antitrust law"

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    The Argument for Robust Competition Supervision in Developing and Transition Countries
    (2016) Emmert, Frank; Robert H. McKinley School of Law
    The article discusses first the differences between market economic models, socialist or planned economies, and economies controlled by monopolies or cartels, to make the case for competition supervision. Subsequently it argues for a broad approach to competition super-vision - beyond a narrow view of antitrust law. The second part of the paper discusses monopoly or dominant position and the criteria to measure them. It reviews the reasons for merger control as a preventive step against monopoly or dominant position. Finally it discusses the issues related to collusion in the form of cartels and how to detect them. The third part of the paper focuses on the best ways for developing and transition countries to introduce or reinforce comprehensive competition supervision: Functioning institutions and how they have to be empowered and structured; priorities to be set; how competition oversight has to be embedded in the legal system, including court review; and why effective enforcement is so important and how it can be promoted. In an annex** there are links to some 75 countries which have newly introduced competition laws in the past 25 years and their legislative materials. Finally, there are links to another 30 countries which have substantially revised their legislative bases in the same time frame.
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    Worlds Colliding: Competition Policy and Bankruptcy Asset Sales
    (2015) Huffman, Max; Robert H. McKinley School of Law
    Modern business bankruptcies commonly involve mergers and acquisitions pursued as “fire sales.” The bankruptcy forum and the unique incentives bankruptcy creates allow those acquisitions to take place with reduced constituent involvement and regulatory oversight. Those fire sale transactions may present antitrust concerns where they lead to undue concentration in the relevant marketplace. This Article studies the poorly explored tension between bankruptcy law, which favors mergers and acquisitions as value maximizing propositions and creates opportunity for fire sales, and antitrust law, which disfavors combinations leading to undue concentrations of economic power. The tension is substantial and manifests both as a matter of substantive law and as a matter of procedures used to implement that law. This paper reveals conflicts between bankruptcy and antitrust and argues that the optimal resolution of those conflicts is to correct for the current subordination of antitrust goals to bankruptcy policies. The Article then offers suggestions for reform.