Browsing by Subject "Formula of universal law"

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    The Problem with Using a Maxim Permissibility Test to Derive Obligations
    (Linköping University Electronic Press, 2022-06-23) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    The purpose of this paper is to show that, if Kant’s universalization formulations of the Categorical Imperative are our only standards for judging right from wrong and permissible from impermissible, then we have no obligations. I shall do this by examining five different views of how obligations can be derived from the universalization formulations and arguing that each one fails. I shall argue that the first view rests on a misunderstanding of the universalization formulations; the second on a misunderstanding of the concept of an obligation; the third on a misunderstanding of the concept of a maxim; the fourth on a misunderstanding of the limits of action description; and the fifth on a misunderstanding of the universalization formulations again.
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    Why Positive Duties cannot Be Derived from Kant’s Formula of Universal Law
    (Springer, 2022-07) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    Ever since Hegel famously objected to Kant’s universalization formulations of the Categorical Imperative on the grounds that they are nothing but an empty formalism, there has been continual debate about whether he was right. In this paper I argue that Hegel got things at least half-right: I argue that even if negative duties can be derived from the universalization formulations, positive duties cannot. The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first, I set out the procedures generally accepted among Kantians for deriving positive duties from the universalization formulations. In the second, I set out the arguments from section 1 in more detail and explain why they do not work. In the third, I examine a strategy that might be used to supplement the arguments from section 2 and I argue that it goes the same way.