Browsing by Subject "Aquinas"

Now showing 1 - 7 of 7
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    Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings
    (Philosophy Education Society, 2004-12) Eberl, Jason T.
    In this paper, I provide a formulation of Thomas Aquinas’s account of the nature of human beings for the purpose of comparing it with other accounts in both the history of philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy. I discuss how his apparently dualistic understanding of the relationship between soul and body yields the conclusion that a human being exists as a unified substance composed of a rational soul informing, that is, serving as the specific organizing principle of, a physical body. I further address the issue of Aquinas’s contention that a human rational soul can exist without being united to a body and show how this ability of a human soul does not contradict the thesis that a human being exists naturally as embodied. I will also respond to two related questions. First, what accounts for the individuation of human beings as distinct members of the human species?Second, what is the principle of identity by which a human being persists through time and change?
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    Aquinas's Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations
    (University of Chicago Press, 2005-08) Eberl, Jason T.
    In addressing bioethical issues at the beginning of human life, such as abortion, in vitro fertilization, and embryonic stem cell research, one primary concern regards establishing when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a person. Thomas Aquinas argues that an embryo or fetus is not a human person until its body is informed by a rational soul. Aquinas’s explicit account of human embryogenesis has been generally rejected by contemporary scholars due to its dependence upon medieval biological data, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research. A number of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas’s basic metaphysical account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human person’s beginning. In this paper, I discuss two recent interpretations in which it is argued that a human person does not begin to exist until a fetus has developed a functioning cerebral cortex.
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    Embryo Adoption: Implications of Personhood, Marriage, and Parenthood
    (2008-04-14T12:30:19Z) McMillen, Brooke Marie; Brand, Peggy Zeglin; Eberl, Jason T.; Burke, Michael B.
    One’s personal claims regarding personhood will influence his moral belief regarding embryo adoption. In Chapter One, I consider the personhood of the human embryo. If the human embryo is a person, we are morally obligated to permit the practice of embryo adoption as an ethical means to save human persons. However, for those who do not claim that an embryo is a person at conception, embryo adoption is not a necessary practice because we have no moral obligation to protect them. There are still others who claim that personhood is gained at some point during gestation when certain mental capacities develop. I offer my own claim that consciousness and sentience as well as the potential to be self-conscious mark the beginning of personhood. Embryo adoption raises several questions surrounding the institution of marriage. Due to its untraditional method of procreation, embryo adoption calls into question the role of procreation within marriage. In Chapter Two, I explore the nature of the marriage relationship by offering Lisa Cahill’s definition of marriage which involves both a spiritual and physical dimension, and then I describe the concept of marriage from different perspectives including a social, religious, and a personal perspective. From a personal perspective, I explore the relationship between marriage and friendship. Finally, I describe how the concept of marriage is understood today and explore the advantages to being married as opposed to the advantages of being single. Embryo adoption changes the way we customarily think about procreation within a family because in embryo adoption, couples are seeking an embryo from another union to be implanted into the woman. This prompts some philosophers to argue that embryo adoption violates the marriage relationship. In Chapter Three, I further consider the impact of embryo adoption on the family as an extension of the marital relationship as well as the impact of embryo adoption on the traditional roles of motherhood and fatherhood. I examine motherhood by looking at how some philosophers define motherhood and when these philosophers claim a woman becomes a mother. After considering these issues regarding motherhood, I examine the same issues surrounding fatherhood. Peg Brand, PhD., Chair
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    Metaphysical and Moral Status of Cryopreserved Embryos
    (Maney Publishing, 2012-08) Eberl, Jason T.
    Those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research argue for a clear position on the metaphysical and moral status of human embryos. This position does not differ whether the embryo is present inside its mother’s reproductive tract or in a cryopreservation tank. It is worth examining, however, whether an embryo in “suspended animation” has the same status as one actively developing in utero. I will explore this question from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human nature. I conclude that a cryopreserved human embryo counts, both metaphysically and morally, as a person; and thus the utilization of such embryos for inherently destructive research purposes is impermissible.
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    Pomponazzi and Aquinas on the Intellective Soul
    (Saint Louis University, 2005-01) Eberl, Jason T.
    One of Thomas Aquinas’s primary philosophical concerns is to provide an account of the nature of a human soul. He bases his account on Aristotle’s De anima [DA], wherein Aristotle gives an account of “soul” (psuchē) as divided into three distinct types: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. Aristotle defines an intellective soul as proper to human beings and the only type of soul that may potentially exist separated from a material body. Aquinas argues that an intellective soul is indeed separable from its body and conceives of it as essentially, or unqualifiedly (simpliciter), immortal and separable from its body, and relatively (secundum quid) mortal and conjoined to its body. Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), a Renaissance philosopher concerned with ridding neo-Aristotelianism of Platonic or Averroistic influences, criticizes Aquinas’s account as not being properly Aristotelian and having been influenced by Platonism. In this paper, I will present summaries of Aquinas’s arguments concerning an intellective soul’s essential immortality, as well as Pomponazzi’s criticisms of Aquinas’s position. I then propose ways in which Aquinas may respond to these criticisms.
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    Potentiality, Possibility, and the Irreversibility of Death
    (Philosophy Education Society, Inc., 2008-09) Eberl, Jason T.
    In this paper, I will consider the case of cryopreservation. A central conceptual focus throughout this discussion is the purportedly irreversible nature of death and the criteria by which a human body is considered to be informed by a rational soul.
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    A Thomistic Understanding of Human Death
    (Blackwell Publishing, 2005-01-17) Eberl, Jason T.
    I will review higher-brain and whole-brain death from the standpoint of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical understanding of human nature. I will critique arguments for higher-brain death being a proper interpretation of Aquinas’s views and make a case for whole-brain death to be compatible with Aquinas’s account of human death given current biological data.