Browsing by Author "de Waal, Cornelis"

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    Charles Sanders Peirce and the Abduction of Einstein: On the Comprehensibility of the World
    (2016) de Waal, Cornelis; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    Einstein was deeply puzzled by the success of natural science, and thought that we would never be able to explain it. He came to this conclusion on the ground that we cannot extract the basic laws of physics from experience using induction or deduction, and he took this to mean that they cannot be arrived at in a logical manner at all. In this paper I use Charles Peirce's logic of abduction, a third mode of reasoning different from deduction and induction, and show that it can be used to explain how laws in physics are arrived at, thereby addressing Einstein's puzzle about the incomprehensible comprehensibility of the universe. Interpreting Einstein's reflections in terms of Peirce's abduction also sheds light on abduction itself, by seeing it applied in an area where our common sense, and with that our intuitions, give us little or no guidance, and is even prone to lead us astray.
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    Peirce and Scientific Realism
    (2022-01) Tekin, Atmaca; de Waal, Cornelis; De Tienne, André; Lyons, Timothy D.
    Scientific realism and antirealism are two main views in the philosophy of science regarding the status of unobservable entities in science and whether we have good epistemic reasons to believe that our current successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Briefly, the former claims that our scientific theories are (approximately) true and unobservable entities these scientific theories postulate exist. On the other hand, the latter claims that we do not have good epistemic reasons to believe that our scientific theories are (approximately) true and that unobservable entities our scientific theories postulate exist. The scientific realism has two primary tenets, one axiological (i.e., science should seek truth) and the other epistemological (namely, our current successful theories are (approximately) true). In this thesis, the issue has been examined from standpoint of the account of Peirce’s philosophy of science, more accurately based on his understanding of reality, truth and basic idealism. In the first chapter, I outline the main points of the debate from the perspectives of both sides. In the second chapter, I give reasons why the scientific realists’ argument is not convincing. In the third chapter, I attempt to draw an accurate picture of the account of Peirce’s views on the nature of scientific theories. In the last chapter, I make a case for scientific realism from the Peircean account of philosophy of science. I have claimed why the current debate cannot be settled without accepting a kind of Peirce's basic idealism and his understanding of reality. I think both scientific realists and antirealists accept a kind of naïve realism. This is the main reason why it is not possible to settle the debate from their standpoints. In order to overcome this issue, I attempt to develop a more sophisticated realism based on Peirce’s understanding of reality, truth and basic idealism.
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    Understanding the Philosophical Positions of Classical and Neo Pragmatists for Mixed Methods Research
    (Springer, 2017-10) Johnson, R. Burke; de Waal, Cornelis; Stefurak, Tres; Hildebrand, David; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    Pragmatism is the most popular philosophy/paradigm in the international field of mixed methods research (MMR). This article therefore introduces, describes, and contrasts the philosophies of the most well known pragmatists, including the three most important classical pragmatists (Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey) and two neopragmatists (Richard Rorty and Susan Haack). It is shown that Rorty and James fit well with qualitatively driven MMR (i. e., MMR where the qualitative component of the study is primary); Peirce fits well with quantitatively driven MMR (i. e., MMR where the quantitative component is primary); and Dewey fits well with MMR that attempts to treat qualitative and quantitative research/philosophy equally (i. e., equal-status mixed methods research). Importantly, it is shown here that pragmatism offers a way out of many philosophy of science quagmires facing social researchers and it offers a promising philosophy for mixed methods research practice.