Browsing by Author "Xiong, Zehui"

Now showing 1 - 6 of 6
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    A trustless architecture of blockchain-enabled metaverse
    (Elsevier, 2023-03) Xu, Minghui; Guo, Yihao; Hu, Qin; Xiong, Zehui; Yu, Dongxiao; Cheng, Xuizhen; Computer and Information Science, School of Science
    Metaverse has rekindled human beings’ desire to further break space-time barriers by fusing the virtual and real worlds. However, security and privacy threats hinder us from building a utopia. A metaverse embraces various techniques, while at the same time inheriting their pitfalls and thus exposing large attack surfaces. Blockchain, proposed in 2008, was regarded as a key building block of metaverses. it enables transparent and trusted computing environments using tamper-resistant decentralized ledgers. Currently, blockchain supports Decentralized Finance (DeFi) and Non-fungible Tokens (NFT) for metaverses. However, the power of a blockchain has not been sufficiently exploited. In this article, we propose a novel trustless architecture of blockchain-enabled metaverse, aiming to provide efficient resource integration and allocation by consolidating hardware and software components. To realize our design objectives, we provide an On-Demand Trusted Computing Environment (OTCE) technique based on local trust evaluation. Specifically, the architecture adopts a hypergraph to represent a metaverse, in which each hyperedge links a group of users with certain relationship. Then the trust level of each user group can be evaluated based on graph analytics techniques. Based on the trust value, each group can determine its security plan on demand, free from interference by irrelevant nodes. Besides, OTCEs enable large-scale and flexible application environments (sandboxes) while preserving a strong security guarantee.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Incentive Mechanism Design for Joint Resource Allocation in Blockchain-Based Federated Learning
    (IEEE, 2023-05) Wang, Zhilin; Hu, Qin; Li, Ruinian; Xu, Minghui; Xiong, Zehui; Computer Science, Luddy School of Informatics, Computing, and Engineering
    Blockchain-based federated learning (BCFL) has recently gained tremendous attention because of its advantages, such as decentralization and privacy protection of raw data. However, there has been few studies focusing on the allocation of resources for the participated devices (i.e., clients) in the BCFL system. Especially, in the BCFL framework where the FL clients are also the blockchain miners, clients have to train the local models, broadcast the trained model updates to the blockchain network, and then perform mining to generate new blocks. Since each client has a limited amount of computing resources, the problem of allocating computing resources to training and mining needs to be carefully addressed. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism to help the model owner (MO) (i.e., the BCFL task publisher) assign each client appropriate rewards for training and mining, and then the client will determine the amount of computing power to allocate for each subtask based on these rewards using the two-stage Stackelberg game. After analyzing the utilities of the MO and clients, we transform the game model into two optimization problems, which are sequentially solved to derive the optimal strategies for both the MO and clients. Further, considering the fact that local training related information of each client may not be known by others, we extend the game model with analytical solutions to the incomplete information scenario. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the validity of our proposed schemes.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Joint User Association and Resource Pricing for Metaverse: Distributed and Centralized Approaches
    (IEEE, 2022-10) Huang, Xumin; Zhong, Weifeng; Nie, Jiangtian; Hu, Qin; Xiong, Zehui; Kang, Jiawen; Quek, Tony Q. S.; Computer and Information Science, School of Science
    Metaverse as the next-generation Internet provides users with physical-virtual world interactions. To improve the quality of immersive experience, users access to Metaverse service providers (MSPs) and purchase bandwidth resource to reduce the communication latency of the Metaverse services. The MSPs decide selling price of the bandwidth resource to maximize the revenue. This leads to a joint user association and resource pricing problem between all users and MSPs. To tackle the problem, we formulate a Stackelberg game where the MSPs are game leaders and users are game followers. We resolve the Stackelberg equilibrium via the distributed and centralized approaches, according to different privacy requirements. In the distributed approach, the MSPs compete against each other to maximize the individual revenue, and a user selects an MSP in a probabilistic manner. The Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved in a privacy-friendly way. In the centralized approach, all MSPs and users accept the unified management and their strategies are instructed. The centralized approach acquires the superior decision-making performance but sacrifices the privacy of the game players. Finally, we provide numerical results to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our schemes.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Nothing Wasted: Full Contribution Enforcement in Federated Edge Learning
    (IEEE Xplore, 2021-10) Hu, Qin; Wang, Shengling; Xiong, Zehui; Cheng, Xiuzhen; Computer and Information Science, School of Science
    The explosive amount of data generated at the network edge makes mobile edge computing an essential technology to support real-time applications, calling for powerful data processing and analysis provided by machine learning (ML) techniques. In particular, federated edge learning (FEL) becomes prominent in securing the privacy of data owners by keeping the data locally used to train ML models. Existing studies on FEL either utilize in-process optimization or remove unqualified participants in advance. In this paper, we enhance the collaboration from all edge devices in FEL to guarantee that the ML model is trained using all available local data to accelerate the learning process. To that aim, we propose a collective extortion (CE) strategy under the imperfect-information multi-player FEL game, which is proved to be effective in helping the server efficiently elicit the full contribution of all devices without worrying about suffering from any economic loss. Technically, our proposed CE strategy extends the classical extortion strategy in controlling the proportionate share of expected utilities for a single opponent to the swiftly homogeneous control over a group of players, which further presents an attractive trait of being impartial for all participants. Both theoretical analysis and experimental evaluations validate the effectiveness and fairness of our proposed scheme.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Online-Learning-Based Fast-Convergent and Energy-Efficient Device Selection in Federated Edge Learning
    (IEEE, 2023-03) Peng, Cheng; Hu, Qin; Wang, Zhilin; Liu, Ryan Wen; Xiong, Zehui; Computer and Information Science, Purdue School of Science
    As edge computing faces increasingly severe data security and privacy issues of edge devices, a framework called federated edge learning (FEL) has recently been proposed to enable machine learning (ML) model training at the edge, ensuring communication efficiency and data privacy protection for edge devices. In this paradigm, the training efficiency has long been challenged by the heterogeneity of communication conditions, computing capabilities, and available data sets at devices. Currently, researchers focus on solving this challenge via device selection from the perspective of optimizing energy consumption or convergence speed. However, the consideration of any one of them is insufficient to guarantee the long-term system efficiency and stability. To fill the gap, we propose an optimization problem to simultaneously minimize the total energy consumption of selected devices and maximize the convergence speed of the global model for device selection in FEL, under the constraints of training data amount and time consumption. For the accurate calculation of energy consumption, we deploy online bandit learning to estimate the CPU-cycle frequency availability of each device, based on an efficient algorithm, named fast-convergent energy-efficient device selection (FCE2DS), is proposed to solve the optimization problem with a low level of time complexity. Through a series of comparative experiments, we evaluate the performance of the proposed FCE2DS scheme, verifying its high training accuracy and energy efficiency.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    zk-PCN: A Privacy-Preserving Payment Channel Network Using zk-SNARKs
    (IEEE, 2022-11) Yu, Wenxuan; Xu, Minghui; Yu, Dongxiao; Cheng, Xiuzhen; Hu, Qin; Xiong, Zehui; Computer and Information Science, School of Science
    Payment channel network (PCN) is a layer-two scaling solution that enables fast off-chain transactions but does not involve on-chain transaction settlement. PCNs raise new privacy issues including balance secrecy, relationship anonymity and payment privacy. Moreover, protecting privacy causes low transaction success rates. To address this dilemma, we propose zk-PCN, a privacy-preserving payment channel network using zk-SNARKs. We prevent from exposing true balances by setting up public balances instead. Using public balances, zk-PCN can guarantee high transaction success rates and protect PCN privacy with zero-knowledge proofs. Additionally, zk-PCN is compatible with the existing routing algorithms of PCNs. To support such compatibility, we propose zk-IPCN to improve zk-PCN with a novel proof generation (RPG) algorithm. zk-IPCN reduces the overheads of storing channel information and lowers the frequency of generating zero-knowledge proofs. Finally, extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of zk-PCN in various settings.