Browsing by Author "Xiao, Yinhao"

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    CommandFence: A Novel Digital-Twin-Based Preventive Framework for Securing Smart Home Systems
    (IEEE, 2023-05) Xiao, Yinhao; Jia, Yizhen; Hu, Qin; Cheng, Xiuzhen; Gong, Bei; Yu, Jiguo; Computer and Information Science, School of Science
    Smart home systems are both technologically and economically advancing rapidly. As people become gradually inalienable to smart home infrastructures, their security conditions are getting more and more closely tied to everyone's privacy and safety. In this paper, we consider smart apps, either malicious ones with evil intentions or benign ones with logic errors, that can cause property loss or even physical sufferings to the user when being executed in a smart home environment and interacting with human activities and environmental changes. Unfortunately, current preventive measures rely on permission-based access control, failing to provide ideal protections against such threats due to the nature of their rigid designs. In this paper, we propose CommandFence, a novel digital-twin-based security framework that adopts a fundamentally new concept of protecting the smart home system by letting any sequence of app commands to be executed in a virtual smart home system, in which a deep-q network (DQN) is used to predict if the sequence could lead to a risky consequence. CommandFence is composed of an Interposition Layer to interpose app commands and an Emulation Layer to figure out whether they can cause any risky smart home state if correlating with possible human activities and environmental changes. We fully implemented our CommandFence implementation and tested against 553 official SmartApps on the Samsung SmartThings platform and successfully identified 34 potentially dangerous ones, with 31 of them reported to be problematic Author: Please provide index terms/keywords for your article. To download the IEEE Taxonomy go to http://www.ieee.org/documents/taxonomy_v101.pdf ?> the first time to our best knowledge. Moreover, We tested our CommandFence on the 10 malicious SmartApps created by Jia et al. 2017, and successfully identified 7 of them as risky, with the missed ones actually only causing smartphone information leak (not harmful to the smart home system). We also tested CommandFence against the 17 benign SmartApps with logic errors developed by Celik et al. 2017, and achieved a 100% accuracy. Our experimental studies indicate that adopting CommandFence incurs a neglectable overhead of 0.1675 seconds.
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    A Correlated Equilibrium based Transaction Pricing Mechanism in Blockchain
    (IEEE, 2020-05) Hu, Qin; Nigam, Yash; Wang, Zhilin; Wang, Yawei; Xiao, Yinhao; Computer and Information Science, School of Science
    Although transaction fees are not obligatory in most of the current blockchain systems, extensive studies confirm their importance in maintaining the security and sustainability of blockchain. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms. Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners, we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions, which can achieve both the individual and global optimum. To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions, we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm, which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.
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    Solving the Federated Edge Learning Participation Dilemma: A Truthful and Correlated Perspective
    (IEEE, 2022-07) Hu, Qin; Li, Feng; Zou, Xukai; Xiao, Yinhao; Computer and Information Science, School of Science
    An emerging computational paradigm, named federated edge learning (FEL), enables intelligent computing at the network edge with the feature of preserving data privacy for edge devices. Given their constrained resources, it becomes a great challenge to achieve high execution performance for FEL. Most of the state-of-the-arts concentrate on enhancing FEL from the perspective of system operation procedures, taking few precautions during the composition step of the FEL system. Though a few recent studies recognize the importance of FEL formation and propose server-centric device selection schemes, the impact of data sizes is largely overlooked. In this paper, we take advantage of game theory to depict the decision dilemma among edge devices regarding whether to participate in FEL or not given their heterogeneous sizes of local datasets. For realizing both the individual and global optimization, the server is employed to solve the participation dilemma, which requires accurate information collection for devices’ local datasets. Hence, we utilize mechanism design to enable truthful information solicitation. With the help of correlated equilibrium , we derive a decision making strategy for devices from the global perspective, which can achieve the long-term stability and efficacy of FEL. For scalability consideration, we optimize the computational complexity of the basic solution to the polynomial level. Lastly, extensive experiments based on both real and synthetic data are conducted to evaluate our proposed mechanisms, with experimental results demonstrating the performance advantages.
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    Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain
    (Elsevier, 2022-03) Wang, Zhilin; Hu, Qin; Wang, Yawei; Xiao, Yinhao; Computer and Information Science, School of Science
    The importance of transaction fees in maintaining blockchain security and sustainability has been confirmed by extensive research, although they are not mandatory in most current blockchain systems. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms. Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners, we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions, which can achieve both the individual and global optimum. To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions, we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm, which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time. We also propose a truthful assessment model for pricing mechanism to collect the feedback of users regarding the price suggestion. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.