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Item Administrative Law: 1983 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law(1984) Wright, R. GeorgeThe Board of Editors of the Indiana Law Review is pleased to publish its eleventh annual Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law. This survey covers the period from May 1, 1982, through May 1, 1983. It combines a scholarly and practical approach in emphasizing recent developments in Indiana case and statutory law. Selected federal case and statutory developments are also included. No attempt has been made to include all developments arising during the survey period or to analyze exhaustively those developments that are included.Item Administrative Law: 1984 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law(1985) Wright, R. GeorgeThe Board of Editors of the Indiana Law Review is pleased to publish its twelfth annual Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law. This survey covers the period from May 1, 1983, through May 1, 1984. It combines a scholarly and practical approach in emphasizing recent developments in Indiana case and statutory law. Selected federal case and statutory developments are also included. No attempt has been made to include all developments arising during the survey period or to analyze exhaustively those developments that are included.Item Arbitrariness: Why the Most Importance Idea in Administrative Law Can't Be Defined, and What This Means for the Law in General(2010) Wright, R. GeorgeBriefly, I will argue that understanding arbitrariness in the law requires an understanding of the conflict between "invariantist" and "contextualist" approaches to the idea of the arbitrary. Contextualism, as I shall define it below, offers the best available understanding of how the idea of arbitrariness actually functions in the law. As we better understand the forms of contextualism, we then understand better the context-dependent multiple meanings of arbitrary. In turn, better understanding the idea of arbitrariness helps us better understand the murkiness and contestedness of the law in general.Item At What Is the Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged(2013) Wright, R. GeorgeItem The Basic Logic of Post-Tinker Jurisprudence(2014) Wright, R. George; Robert H. McKinney School of LawTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District1 is rightly regarded as a landmark student speech case. At this point, however, it is fair and important to ask about the likely consequences of radically abandoning Tinker and the succeeding case law.2 What might it mean, at this historical point, to abandon Tinker along with its qualifying and limiting cases? The discussion below briefly pursues this question and endorses a radical abandonment of Tinker and the succeeding cases as binding case law.Item Broadcast Regulation and the Irrelevant Logic of Strict Scrutiny(2012) Wright, R. GeorgeThis Article focuses on traditional FCC regulation of the content of broadcast entertainment television. Recent litigation involving Fox Television and other broadcasters has raised a number of constitutional issues. This Article, however, makes a fundamental and largely practical point: the basic assumptions underlying traditional FCC regulatory policies have been rendered technologically obsolete. The Article simply assumes, for the sake of argument, that the basic FCC policies are in some respects constitutionally sound. In particular, the Article assumes that the federal government has a sufficient interest in regulating the broadcast entertainment material to which children and young adults are exposed, and in supporting parents’ efforts to control their child’s exposure to such material. The crucial constitutional problem, though, is that the FCC must show that its regulations sufficiently advance the cited interests. This, it turns out, the FCC can no longer do, in light of recent widespread technological developments. Realistically, children and young adults now have convenient alternative forms of access to the sorts of content the FCC continues to seek to regulate. Typically, alternative access can be gained through time-shifted viewing, or through an increasing variety of mainly Internet-based alternatives to real-time television broadcasting received on a TV set. Typical FCC regulations thus now burden broadcaster speech without adequately promoting any sufficient government interest, and are thus in at least this respect unconstitutional.Item Campus Speech and the Functions of the University(2017) Wright, R. GeorgeThe roles and limits of free speech on university campuses have lately been of increasing interest. This Article suggests that as long as our understandings of the basic functions of the university itself are conflicting and contested, our understandings of the proper scope of free speech on campus will be similarly irreconcilable, even if we think of the university in terms of community. The Article explores this thesis through considering, in particular, problems of hostile speech, of professorial academic freedom, and of speech by students transitioning into professional service roles.Item Can Health Care Law and Policy Be Guided by Basic Values?: The Crucial Role of Perfectionist Solidarity(2018) Wright, R. GeorgeAgainst the background of continuing national debate over health care law and policy, this Article addresses questions of fundamental justification. Health care law and policy arrangements are often defended in terms of one form or another of the idea of equality. This Article contends, however, that no conception of equality can adequately serve as the primary or most crucial justificatory value underlying a health care system. The most promising candidate for such a role is, instead, what the Article introduces and describes as the value of perfectionist solidarity.Item Can We Make Sense of Neutrality in the Religion Clause Cases: Seven Rescue Attempts and a Viable Alternative(2012) Wright, R. GeorgeThis Article addresses the controversial question of 'neutrality' as a crucial test in a number of important Religion Clause cases. The idea of 'neutrality' in the Religion Clause context turns out to be popular, but unavoidably incoherent. The Article then explores seven alternative approaches to explaining why Religion Clause neutrality tests persist, despite the evident incoherence of the concept of neutrality. None of these seven alternatives, however, holds much promise for a valuable re-interpretation or rescue of the idea of neutrality. What is needed is not a re-interpretation of Religion Clause neutrality tests, but a replacement for such tests. The Conclusion offers coherent and useful guidance in addressing many Religion Clause cases, based on a surprising adaptation of elements from the apparently remote area of Takings Clause and police power regulation jurisprudence.