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Browsing by Author "Wang, Yawei"
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Item A Correlated Equilibrium based Transaction Pricing Mechanism in Blockchain(IEEE, 2020-05) Hu, Qin; Nigam, Yash; Wang, Zhilin; Wang, Yawei; Xiao, Yinhao; Computer and Information Science, School of ScienceAlthough transaction fees are not obligatory in most of the current blockchain systems, extensive studies confirm their importance in maintaining the security and sustainability of blockchain. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms. Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners, we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions, which can achieve both the individual and global optimum. To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions, we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm, which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.Item Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain(Elsevier, 2022-03) Wang, Zhilin; Hu, Qin; Wang, Yawei; Xiao, Yinhao; Computer and Information Science, School of ScienceThe importance of transaction fees in maintaining blockchain security and sustainability has been confirmed by extensive research, although they are not mandatory in most current blockchain systems. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms. Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners, we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions, which can achieve both the individual and global optimum. To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions, we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm, which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time. We also propose a truthful assessment model for pricing mechanism to collect the feedback of users regarding the price suggestion. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.