Browsing by Author "Tiras, Samuel L."

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
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    The Commitment to Income-Decreasing Accounting Choices as a Credible Signal to Reducing Information Asymmetry: The Case of Asset Revaluations
    (Wiley, 2020) da Costa, Fábio Moraes; Liu, Carol; Cavalier Rosa, Gina; Tiras, Samuel L.; Kelley School of Business
    Bagnoli and Watts (2005) proposed that a manager could reduce information asymmetry by choosing an income-decreasing accounting choice that signals the firm's relatively good future prospects. A limitation in testing this theory is that most income-decreasing accounting choices over time reverse such that aggregated earnings would be the same, regardless of the choice. One income-decreasing accounting choice that never reverses is the choice of upward asset revaluation, where the resulting gains are recognized through other comprehensive income and reduce future earnings by increasing future depreciation expense. In the United Kingdom, prior to FRS15, firms had the option to upwardly revalue on a one-time basis. FRS15, and subsequently International Financial Reporting Standards, however, require those firms that upwardly revalue precommit to revalue on a consistent basis. This precommitment sacrifices future reporting discretion, which, according to the aforementioned study, serves as a costly signal of a firm's relatively good future prospects that reduces information asymmetry. The choice not to upwardly revalue, therefore, serves as a signal of a firm's relatively poor future prospects and also reduces information asymmetry, but this choice does not require precommitment such that the reduction in information asymmetry would be less than the choice to precommit to upward revaluations. Using a propensity-score matched-pair design on a sample of United Kingdom firms to test our predictions during the period requiring precommitment, we find lower forecast dispersion, lower return volatility, and a lower cost of capital for firms that precommit to upward asset revaluations, relative to those firms that choose not to upwardly revalue their operating assets.
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    The Effects of Fair Value on the Matching of Revenues and Expenses: The Case of Asset Revaluations
    (World Scientific, 2020-12) da Costa, Fábio Moraes; Liu, Carol; Cavalier Rosa, Gina; Tiras, Samuel L.; Kelley School of Business
    Researchers and practitioners have expressed concern that matching has declined over time, as evidenced by a decreasing association between revenues and expenses. They attribute this decline to the shift in financial reporting from a revenue–expense view that emphasizes matching to an asset–liability view that emphasizes the measurement of economic resources that incorporates more fair values. When revenues rise with inflation but the expenses remain tied to historical costs, the two streams tend to diverge. We hypothesize that upwardly revaluing the long-lived fixed operating assets resets the expense stream; thus, changes in revenues will be more closely associated with changes in expenses for firms that revalue than firms that do not upwardly revalue. Based on a sample of United Kingdom firms, we find evidence supporting our expectations, particularly in those higher inflationary industries.
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    How Changes in Expectations of Earnings Affect the Associations of Earnings Overstatements and Audit Effort with Audit Risk and Market Price
    (Wiley, 2022) Patterson, Evelyn R.; Smith, J. Reed; Tiras, Samuel L.; Kelley School of Business - Indianapolis
    In this study, we provide theoretical guidance for both analytical research and empirical research by considering how changing expectations of earnings affect a dishonest manager's strategy to overstate earnings and an auditor's strategy to exert effort in a two-period setting. We expect our study's insights on changing economic conditions to help shape future research. We model the manager type as either honest or dishonest, which allows us to differentiate audit risk from audit effort. The key takeaways for future research are the insights on how changes in payoffs and expected earnings affect the associations that involve earnings overstatements and audit effort with audit risk and market price. For instance, researchers typically assume audit effort and audit risk are negatively associated, but we find the association can be positive when, for example, the auditor chooses a period 2 strategy based on the changes in period 1 game parameters. The results of our study provide two additional key insights on the design of future empirical tests. First, by dichotomizing, we show the importance of estimating the intercept in the market pricing equation when studying earnings quality, because market price also adjusts for expected bias through changes in the intercept. Second, our multiperiod setting demonstrates that the effects from a change in the manager's or auditor's incentives in period 1 may reverse in period 2. Empirical studies typically examine the contemporaneous effects of these changes on market price and/or audit risk but fail to identify the cross-temporal effects we document in our study.
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    The Interrelation between Audit Quality and Managerial Reporting Choices and Its Effects on Financial Reporting Quality
    (Wiley, 2019-03-13) Patterson, Evelyn R.; Smith, J. Reed; Tiras, Samuel L.; Kelley School of Business
    Two distinct lines of research have been dedicated to empirically testing how financial reporting quality (measured as the earnings response coefficient or ERC) is associated with management's choice of reporting bias and with audit quality. However, researchers have yet to consider how ERCs are affected by either the auditor's reaction to changes in the manager's reporting bias or the manager's reaction to changes in audit quality. Our study provides theoretical guidance on these interrelations and how changes in the manager's or the auditor's incentives affect both reporting bias and audit quality. Specifically, when the manager's cost (benefit) of reporting bias increases (decreases), we find that expected bias decreases, inducing the auditor to react by reducing audit quality. Because we also find that the association between expected audit quality and ERCs is always positive, changes in managerial incentives for biased reporting lead to a positive association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. When the cost of auditing decreases or the cost of auditor liability increases, we find that expected audit quality increases, inducing the manager to react by decreasing reporting bias. In this case, changes in the costs of audit quality lead to a negative association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of our theoretical findings by focusing on the empirical observations documented in the extant literature on managerial ownership and accounting expertise on the audit committee. In light of our framework, we provide new interpretations of these empirical observations and new predictions for future research.