Browsing by Author "Tilley, John J."

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    Alzheimer's Disease Narratives and the Myth of Human Being
    (2012-12-11) Rieske, Tegan Echo; Schultz, Jane E.; Johnson, Karen Ramsay; Tilley, John J.
    The ‘loss of self’ trope is a pervasive shorthand for the prototypical process of Alzheimer's disease (AD) in the popular imagination. Turned into an effect of disease, the disappearance of the self accommodates a biomedical story of progressive deterioration and the further medicalization of AD, a process which has been storied as an organic pathology affecting the brain or, more recently, a matter of genetic calamity. This biomedical discourse of AD provides a generic framework for the disease and is reproduced in its illness narratives. The disappearance of self is a mythic element in AD narratives; it necessarily assumes the existence of a singular and coherent entity which, from the outside, can be counted as both belonging to and representing an individual person. The loss of self, as the rhetorical locus of AD narrative, limits the privatization of the experience and reinscribes cultural storylines---storylines about what it means to be a human person. The loss of self as it occurs in AD narratives functions most effectively in reasserting the presence of the human self, in contrast to an anonymous, inhuman nonself; as AD discourse details a loss of self, it necessarily follows that the thing which is lost (the self) always already existed. The private, narrative self of individual experience thus functions as proxy to a collective human identity predicated upon exceptionalism: an escape from nature and the conditions of the corporeal environment.
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    Butler's Stone
    (Wiley, 2018-12) Tilley, John J.; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    In the eleventh of Joseph Butler's Fifteen Sermons we find his best‐known argument against psychological hedonism. Elliott Sober calls that argument Butler's stone, and famously challenges it. I consider whether Butler's stone has value. In doing so I examine, and reject, two possible responses to Sober's objection. This involves, in part, discussing Lord Kames's version of the stone argument, which has hitherto escaped scholarly attention. Finally, I explain an important value of Butler's stone, which I have not found previously discussed. Butler's stone blocks an inference, persuasive to many people, which purports to show that we intrinsically desire only pleasure.
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    "Charity Never Faileth": Philanthropy in the Short Fiction of Herman Melville
    (2014) Goldfarb, Nancy D.; Schultz, Jane E.; Eller, Jonathan R., 1952-; Robertson, Nancy Marie, 1956-; Tilley, John J.
    This dissertation analyzes the critique of charity and philanthropy implicit in Melville’s short fiction written for periodicals between 1853 and 1856. Melville utilized narrative and tone to conceal his opposition to prevailing ideologies and manipulated narrative structures to make the reader complicit in the problematic assumptions of a market economy. Integrating close readings with critical theory, I establish that Melville was challenging the new rhetoric of philanthropy that created a moral identity for wealthy men in industrial capitalist society. Through his short fiction, Melville exposed self-serving conduct and rationalizations when they masqueraded as civic-minded responses to the needs of the community. Melville was joining a public conversation about philanthropy and civic leadership in an American society that, in its pursuit of private wealth, he believed was losing touch with the democratic and civic ideals on which the nation had been founded. Melville’s objection was not with charitable giving; rather, he objected to its use as a diversion from honest reflection on one’s responsibilities to others.
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    Equipoise and Skepticism: Past, Present and Future
    (2008-08-22T14:35:30Z) Witt, John R.; Meslin, Eric Mark; Tilley, John J.; Lyons, Timothy D.
    Currently, the predominant view in research ethics maintains that physicians can morally justify offering randomized clinical trial enrollment to their patients only if some form of equipoise is present. Thus, the physician must experience (either individually or communally) a state of reasoned uncertainty concerning the relative merits of two or more competing treatments for a given disease before she may recommend that her patient participate in a clinical trial. Increasingly, however, this position has been subject to critical attention and considerable negative scrutiny. My argument engages this trend by turning to the history of philosophy; here I claim that the use of the term “equipoise” in the medical research context is extremely similar to terms and concepts from the philosophical tradition of skepticism, and as a result of this similarity it is possible to understand the principle of equipoise’s vulnerability to already published criticisms. A comparison of the criticisms of equipoise within the medical research literature to criticisms of philosophical skepticism reveals a potentially grim future for equipoise as a legitimate guiding principle for the ethical conduct of clinical research.
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    Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke on Desire and Self-Interest
    (Taylor & Francis, 2019) Tilley, John J.; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    Among the most animating debates in eighteenth-century British ethics was the debate over psychological egoism, the view that our most basic desires are self-interested. An important episode in that debate, less well known than it should be, was the exchange between Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke of Hull. In the early editions of his Inquiry into Virtue, Hutcheson argued ingeniously against psychological egoism; in his Foundation of Morality, Clarke argued ingeniously against Hutcheson’s arguments. Later, Hutcheson attempted new arguments against psychological egoism, designed to overcome Clarke’s objections. This article examines the exchange between these philosophers. Its conclusion, influenced partly by Clarke, is that psychological egoism withstands Hutcheson’s arguments. This is not to belittle those arguments—indeed, they are among the most resourceful and plausible of their kind. The fact that egoism withstands them is thus not a mere negative result, but a stimulus to consider carefully the ways in which progress in this area may be possible.
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    An Instrumentalist's Guide to the Perpetuation of Human Individuality
    (2010-10-15) Takacs, Steven J.; Coleman, Martin A.; Houser, Nathan; Tilley, John J.
    John Dewey’s account of human individuality blends various ideas that cut across many of his works. In “Time and Individuality,” Dewey discusses the essence of the individual as “temporal seriality.” In Human Nature and Conduct, he talks about the self as a collection of habits that change throughout one’s life. In A Common Faith, Dewey calls the whole self an ideal. Furthermore, Dewey addresses the issue of one’s individuality being threatened if one falls victim to mechanistic and mindless routines; that is, when routine shrouds one’s daily activities, moral and intellectual growth is stunted. Ensnarement in routine is the mechanization of daily activities that unfold in an uninspired and lethargic manner. Although Dewey discusses how individuality can be threatened, his thoughts on the subject nonetheless turn on the idea that if life is to be meaningful, one must learn to express one’s individuality. For Dewey, the authentic expression of individuality is art. But, how does one express one’s individuality? Are there any tools within Dewey’s philosophy that can be used to ensure the perpetuation of one’s individuality. The impetus for this thesis is to provide an analysis of key texts that are not only relevant to Dewey’s account of human individuality, but that are also relevant to Dewey’s instrumentalism. Through close textual analysis, I will seek to highlight elements in Dewey’s philosophy that can be used to ensure the continuation of one’s individuality. The following question will thus serve as a guide throughout this inquiry: “If human individuality can be threatened and even lost, what are some practical ideas in Dewey’s philosophy that can be used to ensure the perpetuation of one’s individuality?”