Browsing by Author "Lang, Joseph B."

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    A bigger piece of the pie? State corrections spending and the politics of social order
    (2007-02) Stucky, Thomas D.; Heimer, Karen; Lang, Joseph B.
    The dramatic increase in American state prison populations during the past three decades has sparked considerable research interest. Empirical research has most often examined changes in prison admissions or populations, but few studies have considered shifts in state corrections budgets. This study examines variation in annual, state-level corrections expenditures as a proportion of state expenditures from 1980 to 1998, drawing together existing theoretical arguments about criminal punishment under a common rubric that focuses on state responsibility for the maintenance of social order and the need for state officials to maintain office through popular election. From this view, partisan politics, economic and racial threats, citizen preferences, fiscal considerations, policy priorities, and crime are important explanations of corrections spending because they affect strategies for maintaining social order, garnering votes, and maintaining political office. Findings generally support this perspective. Partisan politics, racial threats, state economic prosperity, and budgetary priorities all play a role in determining state corrections expenditures.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    PARTISAN POLITICS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND IMPRISONMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATES OVER TIME
    (2005-02) Stucky, Thomas D.; Heimer, Karen; Lang, Joseph B.
    The now well-documented explosion in prison populations over the last 30 years has spurred significant attention in the literature. Early research focused primarily on economic explanations. More recently it has focused on political explanations of prison growth. Here we extend research on political explanations of imprisonment by drawing on the literature on state politics and public policy. We argue that the effect of partisan politics on punishment is conditional on how much electoral competition legislators face. We test this hypothesis using annual state level data on imprisonment from 1978 to 1996. Our findings show that the effect of Republican state legislative strength on prison admissions depends on time and the level of competition in state legislative elections. We argue that these findings suggest the need for a more nuanced understanding of the link between partisan U.S. politics and imprisonment.