Browsing by Author "Kahn, Samuel"

Now showing 1 - 10 of 23
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    Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kant's Formula of Universal Law
    (2014-03) Kahn, Samuel
    According to the standard reading of Kant's formula of universal law (FUL), positive duties can be derived from FUL. In this article, I argue that the standard reading does not work. In the first section, I articulate FUL and what I mean by a positive duty. In the second section, I set out an intuitive version of the standard reading of FUL and argue that it does not work. In the third section, I set out a more rigorous version of the standard reading of FUL and argue that even this more rigorous version does not work.
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    Defending Kant’s conception of matter from the charge of circularity
    (De Gruyter, 2017-06) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS) Kant develops a conception of matter that is meant to issue in an alternative to what he takes to be the then reigning empiricist account of density. However, in recent years commentator after commentator has argued that Kant’s attempt on this front is faced with insuperable difficulties. Indeed, even Kant seems to have thought that his theory of density is circular, and some of these commentators argue that this is, at least in part, what spurred Kant on to develop the theory of matter found in the Opus Postumum. Against this growing tide (and even, it seems, against Kant himself) I defend Kant’s theory of density. I shall not take a stand on whether the circularity problem played a role in the development of the Opus Postumum theory of matter – my point is simply that if the circularity problem was the sole trigger for that move, then the move was unwarranted.
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    A Dilemma for Mathematical Constructivism
    (Springer, 2021) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    In this paper I argue that constructivism in mathematics faces a dilemma. In particular, I maintain that constructivism is unable to explain (1) the application of mathematics to nature and (2) the intersubjectivity of mathematics unless (3) it is conjoined with two theses that reduce it to a form of mathematical Platonism. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section of the paper, I explain the difference between mathematical constructivism and mathematical Platonism and I outline my argument. In the second, I argue that the best explanation of how mathematics applies to nature for a constructivist is a thesis I call Copernicanism. In the third, I argue that the best explanation of how mathematics can be intersubjective for a constructivist is a thesis I call Ideality. In the fourth, I argue that once constructivism is conjoined with these two theses, it collapses into a form of mathematical Platonism. In the fifth, I confront some objections.
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    The Guise of the Objectively Good
    (Springer., 2013-06) Kahn, Samuel
    According to one influential version of the derivation of Kant’s Formula of Humanity, agents necessarily represent their ends as objectively good. In this paper I argue that there is good reason to think that this is false, that it is not the case that agents necessarily represent their ends as objectively good. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I explain what is at stake in the argument for FH. In the second, I explain the relevant terms and introduce some alternative positions that are available. In the third, I argue that there is good reason to think that it is not the case that agents necessarily represent their ends as objectively good and in the fourth, I consider a potential reply to this argument.
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    The Interconnection of Willing and Believing in Kant’s and Kantian Ethics
    (International Philosophical Quarterly., 2014-06) Kahn, Samuel
    In this paper I look at the connection between willing and believing for Kant’s and Kantian ethics. I argue that the two main formulations of the categorical imperative are relativized to agents according to their beliefs. I then point out three different ways in which Kant or a present-day Kantian might defend this position. I conclude with some remarks about the contrast between Kant’s legal theory and his ethical theory.
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    Is the Final Chapter of the Metaphysics of morals also the Final Chapter of the Practical Postulates?
    (American Catholic Philosophical Association., 2015) Kahn, Samuel
    In this paper I trace the arc of Kant’s critical stance on the belief in God, beginning with the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and culminating in the final chapter of the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). I argue that toward the end of his life, Kant changed his views on two important topics. First, despite his stinging criticism of it in the Critique of Pure Reason, by the time of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to endorse the physico-theological argument. Second, some time around the publication of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to move away from the argument for the practical postulates
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    Kant and the duty to promote one’s own happiness
    (Taylor & Francis, 2018) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for ‘this happens unavoidably’ (MS, AA 6:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness.
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    Kant and the trolley
    (Springer, 2021-07) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
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    Kant, the Practical Postulates, and Clifford’s Principle
    (Brill, 2020) Kahn, Samuel; Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts
    In this paper I argue that Kant would have endorsed Clifford’s principle. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review Kant’s argument for the practical postulates. In the second, I discuss a traditional objection to the style of argument Kant employs. In the third, I explain how Kant would respond to this objection and how this renders the practical postulates consistent with Clifford’s principle. In the fourth, I introduce positive grounds for thinking that Kant would have endorsed this principle.