Browsing by Author "Mak, Henry Y."

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    The effect of sugar-sweetened beverage consumption on childhood obesity - causal evidence
    (2016-05-18) Yang, Yan; Terza, Joseph V.; Courtemanche, Charles; Jung, Haeil; Mak, Henry Y.; Wu, Jisong
    Communities and States are increasingly targeting the consumption of sugar sweetened beverages (SSBs), especially soda, in their efforts to curb childhood obesity. However, the empirical evidence based on which policy makers design the relevant policies is not causally interpretable. In the present study, we suggest a modeling framework that can be used for making causal estimation and inference in the context of childhood obesity. This modeling framework is built upon the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) instrumental variables method and have two levels – level one models children’s lifestyle choices and level two models children’s energy balance which is assumed to be dependent on their lifestyle behaviors. We start with a simplified version of the model that includes only one policy, one lifestyle, one energy balance, and one observable control variable. We then extend this simple version to be a general one that accommodates multiple policy and lifestyle variables. The two versions of the model are 1) first estimated via the nonlinear least square (NLS) method (henceforth NLS-based 2SRI); and 2) then estimated via the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method (henceforth MLE-based 2SRI). Using simulated data, we show that 1) our proposed 2SRI method outperforms the conventional method that ignores the inherent nonlinearity [the linear instrumental variables (LIV) method] or the potential endogeneity [the nonlinear regression (NR) method] in obtaining the relevant estimators; and 2) the MLE-based 2SRI provides more efficient estimators (also consistent) compared to the NLS-based one. Real data analysis is conducted to illustrate the implementation of 2SRI method in practice using both NLS and MLE methods. However, due to data limitation, we are not able to draw any inference regarding the impacts of lifestyle, specifically SSB consumption, on childhood obesity. We are in the process of getting better data and, after doing so, we will replicate and extend the analyses conducted here. These analyses, we believe, will produce causally interpretable evidence of the effects of SSB consumption and other lifestyle choices on childhood obesity. The empirical analyses presented in this dissertation should, therefore, be viewed as an illustration of our newly proposed framework for causal estimation and inference.
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    Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership
    (Elsevier, 2018-08) Liu, Ting; Ma, Ching-to Albert; Mak, Henry Y.; Economics, School of Liberal Arts
    A Principal has a set of projects, each having different benefit potentials, and each requiring a basic technology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from production, but have private information of their own motivation preferences and project potentials. Technology and time-input choices are experts’ private decisions. Experts form a Partnership, which designs a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to determine experts’ priority on technology choice. Using a linear cost-share contract that lets experts make minimum profits, the Principal implements the first best by delegating all decisions to the Partnership.
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    Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement
    (Elsevier, 2015-09) Ma, Ching-to Albert; Mak, Henry Y.; Department of Economics, School of Liberal Arts
    A health care provider chooses unobservable service-quality and cost-reduction efforts. The efforts produce quality and cost efficiency. An insurer observes quality and cost, and chooses how to disclose this information to consumers. The insurer also decides how to pay the provider. In prospective payment, the insurer fully discloses quality, and sets a prospective payment price. In cost reimbursement, the insurer discloses a value index, a weighted average of quality and cost efficiency, and pays a margin above cost. The first-best quality and cost efforts can be implemented by prospective payment and by cost reimbursement. Cost reimbursement with value index eliminates dumping and cream skimming. Prospective payment with quality index eliminates cream skimming.
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    Managing imperfect competition by pay for performance and reference pricing
    (Elsevier, 2018-01) Mak, Henry Y.; Economics, School of Liberal Arts
    I study a managed health service market where differentiated providers compete for consumers by choosing multiple service qualities, and where copayments that consumers pay and payments that providers receive for services are set by a payer. The optimal regulation scheme is two-sided. On the demand side, it justifies and clarifies value-based reference pricing. On the supply side, it prescribes pay for performance when consumers misperceive service benefits or providers have intrinsic quality incentives. The optimal bonuses are expressed in terms of demand elasticities, service technology, and provider characteristics. However, pay for performance may not outperform prospective payment when consumers are rational and providers are profit maximizing, or when one of the service qualities is not contractible.
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    Provider Performance Reports and Consumer Welfare
    (Wiley, 2017) Mak, Henry Y.; Department of Economics, School of Liberal Arts
    A provider's performance report consists of his service average outcome and volume. The two variables depend on the provider's private quality type and current demand, but he can raise his average outcome by dumping vulnerable consumers. Prospective consumers infer providers' qualities from their reports. Performance reporting drives some providers to dump consumers when competition is intense, but it may not reveal providers' qualities when their average quality is high. Statistical adjustment aiming at making reports independent of consumer characteristics can lead to more dumping, less informative reports, or both. There is more dumping when volume information is withheld and less dumping when ratings information is coarse.