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Browsing by Author "Houser, Nathan"
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Item Being in the World(2015) Houser, Nathan; Department of Philosophy, School of Liberal ArtsThis essay addresses a question raised by Helmut Pape: “What logical, semiotical and mental structure does our consciousness have to have in order to establish the proper link between perception, thought and propositional content expressed by indicators?” The answer, it is proposed, is found in Peirce’s Existential Graphs (EG). First, EG is, itself, a model of cognition that provides the formal structure required for such a consciousness. Second, an appropriate semiotical interpretation will give us the requested structure. Third, interpreted as a psychological or perceptual model, EG will represent the links we seek.Item An Instrumentalist's Guide to the Perpetuation of Human Individuality(2010-10-15) Takacs, Steven J.; Coleman, Martin A.; Houser, Nathan; Tilley, John J.John Dewey’s account of human individuality blends various ideas that cut across many of his works. In “Time and Individuality,” Dewey discusses the essence of the individual as “temporal seriality.” In Human Nature and Conduct, he talks about the self as a collection of habits that change throughout one’s life. In A Common Faith, Dewey calls the whole self an ideal. Furthermore, Dewey addresses the issue of one’s individuality being threatened if one falls victim to mechanistic and mindless routines; that is, when routine shrouds one’s daily activities, moral and intellectual growth is stunted. Ensnarement in routine is the mechanization of daily activities that unfold in an uninspired and lethargic manner. Although Dewey discusses how individuality can be threatened, his thoughts on the subject nonetheless turn on the idea that if life is to be meaningful, one must learn to express one’s individuality. For Dewey, the authentic expression of individuality is art. But, how does one express one’s individuality? Are there any tools within Dewey’s philosophy that can be used to ensure the perpetuation of one’s individuality. The impetus for this thesis is to provide an analysis of key texts that are not only relevant to Dewey’s account of human individuality, but that are also relevant to Dewey’s instrumentalism. Through close textual analysis, I will seek to highlight elements in Dewey’s philosophy that can be used to ensure the continuation of one’s individuality. The following question will thus serve as a guide throughout this inquiry: “If human individuality can be threatened and even lost, what are some practical ideas in Dewey’s philosophy that can be used to ensure the perpetuation of one’s individuality?”Item A Peircean Critique of and Alternative to Intentionalism about Perceptual Experience(2007-02-05T15:50:40Z) Kruidenier, Daniel E.; Houser, NathanMy thesis is broadly construed this way: intentionalism, as a theory about perceptual experience, says that the intentional character of perceptual experience determines the phenomenological character of that experience. In some way, to be explained, phenomenology is determined by intentional content. I will show that intentionalism fails on two accounts. It fails to replace the sense-data theory as an explanation of the content of perceptual experience. It also fails to deal satisfactorily with the problem of perceptual illusion. I will then offer an alternative rooted in the perceptual theory of Charles Peirce. I believe his critical but common sense approach preserves the intuition of sense-data theory, that perception is primarily a relation between perceivers and objects. Peirce’s theory also provides a better solution to the problem of illusion.Item Vagueness and Its Boundaries: A Peircean Theory of Vagueness(2010-02-26T18:35:42Z) Agler, David Wells; De Waal, Cornelis; De Tienne, André; Houser, NathanMany theories of vagueness employ question-begging assumptions about the semantic boundaries between truth and falsity. This thesis defends a theory of vagueness put forward by Charles S. Peirce and argues for a novel solution to the sorites paradox based upon his work. Contrary to widespread opinion, I argue that Peirce distinguished borderline vagueness from other related forms of indeterminacy, e.g. indefiniteness, generality, unspecificity, uninformativity, etc. By clarifying Peirce’s conception of borderline vagueness, I argue for a solution to the sorites paradox based upon his logical semantics. In addition, I argue for this theory against the epistemic theory of vagueness, which makes controversial claims concerning the sharp semantic boundary between truth and falsity, and against the supervaluationist theory of vagueness, which is committed to the in principle impossibility of sharp semantics boundaries for propositions with vague terms.