Browsing by Author "Dutton, Yvonne M."

Now showing 1 - 10 of 27
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    Advancing Faculty Diversity Through Self-Directed Mentoring
    (2017) Dutton, Yvonne M.; Ryznar, Margaret; Shaver, Lea
    Mentoring is widely acknowledged to be important in career success, yet may be lacking for female and minority law professors, contributing to disparities in retention and promotion of diverse faculty. This Article presents the results of a unique diversity mentoring program conducted at one law school. Mentoring is often thought of as something directed by the mentor on behalf of the protégé. Our framework inverts that model, empowering diverse faculty members to proactively cultivate their own networks of research mentors. The studied intervention consisted of modest programming on mentorship, along with supplemental travel funds to focus specifically on travel for the purpose of cultivating mentors beyond one’s own institution. Participants were responsible for setting their own mentorship goals, approaching mentors and arranging meetings, and reporting annually on their activities and progress. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence demonstrate that the program has been effective along its measurable goals in its first year. Participants report growing their networks of mentors, receiving significant advice on research and the tenure process, and being sponsored for new opportunities. The authors conclude that this type of mentoring initiative, if more broadly applied, could have a significant impact on reducing disparities in retention and promotion in the legal academy. To facilitate such replication, the Article describes both the process of designing the program and the actual operation of the program as carried out at one school. In sum, the Article offers a concrete starting point for discussions at any law school interested in advancing faculty diversity through improved mentoring.
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    Assessing Online Learning in Law Schools: Students Say Online Classes Deliver
    (2019) Dutton, Yvonne M.; Ryznar, Margaret; Long, Kayleigh
    This Article provides empirical data on the effectiveness of distance education in law schools following the American Bar Association's decision to increase the number of permitted online course credits from fifteen to thirty. Our data, composed of law student surveys and focus groups, reveals not only the success of distance education in legal education, but also the online teaching methods that are most effective for students.
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    Commitment to International Human Rights Treaties : The Role of Enforcement Mechanisms
    (2012) Dutton, Yvonne M.
    States continue to abuse human rights and commit mass atrocities even though for the past several decades they have overwhelmingly ratified a host of international human rights treaties. This Article seeks to explain this phenomenon and suggests that where treaty enforcement mechanisms are too weak for states to view them as a credible threat to their sovereignty, even states with the worst practices will regularly and readily commit to treaties designed to promote better human rights practices. I empirically test my credible threat theory against the explanatory power of other extant theories about treaty commitment by examining the relationship between treaty enforcement mechanisms and likelihood of ratification across a broad range of treaties. I include in my analysis the treaty creating the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)--a treaty which contains a strong enforcement mechanism in the form of an independent Prosecutor and the Court, which can punish violators. The results of the statistical tests using data from 1966 to 2008 provide support for the credible threat theory. I find that a state's human rights ratings do not influence ratification of international human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms, such as those that only require the state to self-report its compliance. However, states with poorer records are significantly less likely to commit to the ICC treaty. The implication is that where enforcement mechanisms are strong, states may take their commitment more seriously and join only if they intend to comply. If we structure treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms, perhaps fewer states will ratify, but at least when they do, they may be held to that commitment.
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    Funding Terrorism: The Problem of Ransom Payments
    (2016) Dutton, Yvonne M.; Robert H. McKinley School of Law
    Concerns about the increased role ransoms play in funding terrorism have led to calls for a universal policy banning ransom payments to terrorists. In June 2013, the G8 leaders issued a communiqué in which they recognized that ransom payments to terrorists helps to strengthen the organization and fund future incidents of kidnapping for ransom. The G8 leaders accordingly “welcome[d] efforts to prevent kidnapping and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments.” In January 2014, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a Resolution expressing concern about the increase in terrorist kidnappings for ransom and that the payments fund future hostage-takings. It further called on states to prevent terrorists from benefiting from ransom payments and to work with the private sector so that they would respond to kidnappings without paying ransoms. Additional Security Council Resolutions referencing a ransom ban have followed. What, though, is the import of these recent measures? Analysis of the text of the communiqué and the resolutions shows that they do not create clear, binding, and enforceable obligations on states to refuse to pay ransoms to terrorists. This means that there is also reason to expect that states that have previously acceded to terrorist ransom demands or permitted their citizens to pay ransoms to terrorists will not change their behavior. Thus, these recent measures present a puzzle: namely, if they are not obligatory and backed by enforcement mechanisms to hold states accountable, why were they adopted? This Article draws on the literature about norm influence to suggest an answer: adopting these measures has the potential to impact behavior in a meaningful and constructive way in the future. In fact, this Article suggests that the only realistic avenue to produce change in this context is through persuasion, as opposed to force. Consider the ethical dilemma. Even if a state is comfortable enforcing its own “no concessions” policies, why would it want to assume the ethical burden of forcing another state to sacrifice the lives of its citizens? States may feel similarly as regards the private sector: while they may not want the private sector to pay ransoms, punishing individuals who pay under duress for the safe return of their loved ones is not generally consistent with the criminal law: it seems ethically and morally wrong. Urging states and citizens to refuse to pay ransoms because doing so serves the greater goals of depriving terrorists of funding and the motivation for future kidnappings is a different matter. When one “urges,” as opposed to “forces,” one does not assume the ultimate decision of whether to pay or not.
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    Gunslingers on the High Seas: A Call for Regulation
    (Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 2013) Dutton, Yvonne M.
    Since only mid-2011, states have increasingly authorized their shippers to hire private armed guards to protect them as they travel through pirate-infested waters. Estimates indicate that in 2011, the percentage of ships employing armed guards rose from approximately 10% to upwards of 50%. Primarily, the guards are hired out by the 200 to 300 private maritime security companies (PMSCs) that have been created overnight to capitalize on this new opportunity. This article recognizes the importance of protecting innocent seafarers from violent pirate attacks. It also recognizes that the worlds' navies may not be able to protect each and every ship and crew from being attacked. Nevertheless, it argues that states should not be permitted to include private citizens in the fight against piracy without first ensuring that those guards will abide by governing laws and norms and be held accountable should they fail to do so. Yet, as the article shows through a comparison and analysis of the laws and guidance of five states, only some states appear to be providing any guidance regarding the necessary training and qualifications that armed guards must possess or how and when they may lawfully use and transport weapons. This article argues that states need to do more. At the very least, it urges states to agree on vetting and monitoring procedures to make certain that any guards who are hired by shippers are well trained and prepared to safely transport, store, and use weapons. States are responsible for the fight against piracy, and if they want to include private contractors in that fight, then they should act responsibly and regulate and monitor the guards' conduct. Otherwise, in a world where each state is creating its own rules or even no rules at all, the likely outcome is chaotic and violent seas — and perhaps the next "Blackwater" moment.