Kahn, Samuel2025-01-102025-01-102023-12Kahn, S. (2023). Frankfurt Cases and Alternate Deontic Categories. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue Canadienne de Philosophie, 62(3), 539–552. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217323000112https://hdl.handle.net/1805/45253In Harry Frankfurt’s seminal “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” he advances an argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: if an agent is responsible for performing some action, then she is able to do otherwise. However, almost all of the Frankfurt cases in this literature involve impermissible actions. In this article, I argue that the failure to consider other deontic categories exposes a deep problem, one that threatens either to upend much current moral theorizing or to upend the relevance of Frankfurt cases.enPublisher PolicyFrankfurt casesmere permissibilityprinciple of alternate possibilities (PAP)Article