Kahn, Samuel2017-06-022017-06-022013-06Kahn, Samuel. "The Guise of the Objectively Good." Journal of Value Inquiry 47, 1-2 (2013): 87-99. DOI: 10.1007/s10790-013-9372-2https://hdl.handle.net/1805/12812Author Posting of a preprint © Springer, 2013. This article is posted here for personal use, not for redistribution. The article was published in The Journal of Value Inquiry, Volume 47, Issue 1-2, June 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-013-9372-2According to one influential version of the derivation of Kant’s Formula of Humanity, agents necessarily represent their ends as objectively good. In this paper I argue that there is good reason to think that this is false, that it is not the case that agents necessarily represent their ends as objectively good. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I explain what is at stake in the argument for FH. In the second, I explain the relevant terms and introduce some alternative positions that are available. In the third, I argue that there is good reason to think that it is not the case that agents necessarily represent their ends as objectively good and in the fourth, I consider a potential reply to this argument.en-USAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United StatesKanthumanityformula of humanityArticle10.1007/s10790-013-9372-2