Kahn, Samuel J. M.2024-01-232024-01-232022-04Kahn, S. J. M. (2022). Nary an Obligatory Maxim from Kant’s Universalizability Tests. Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie, 5(1), 15–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-022-00115-0https://hdl.handle.net/1805/38122In this paper I argue that there would be no obligatory maxims if the only standards for assessing maxims were Kant’s universalizability tests. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I clarify my thesis: I define my terms and disambiguate my thesis from other related theses for which one might argue. In the second, I confront the view that says that if a maxim passes the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt that maxim; I also confront a close relative of this view. In the third, I confront the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt the contradictory of that maxim. In the fourth, I confront two variations of the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests and an agent is deliberating about the action in the maxim, then the agent has a positive duty to adopt the contrary of that maxim. In the fifth, I confront the view that says that if an agent has adopted a maxim of ends, then the agent has a positive duty to universalize that end. I then wrap up the paper with some concluding remarks.en-USPublisher Policyobligatory maximsKant’s universalizability testspositive dutyArticle