Carmichael, Chad2023-03-032023-03-032021-12Carmichael, C. (2021). A new problem for internalism. Synthese, 199(5), 13187–13199. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03372-50039-7857, 1573-0964https://hdl.handle.net/1805/31603I will argue that internalism about justification entails the apparently absurd conclusion that it is possible to know specific facts about the external world—for example, that there is a tree in the quad—on the basis of introspection and a priori reflection. After a brief characterization of internalism (§1), I will set out the problem (§2). I will then discuss three replies: one that denies the form of doxastic voluntarism involved in the problem (§3), one that denies that knowledge of higher-order facts about justification can justify corresponding first-order beliefs (§4), and, finally, one that involves biting the bullet (§5). I will argue that each reply fails.en-USPublisher PolicyExternalismHigher-order evidenceIntrospectionDoxastic voluntarismArticle