Goranova, MariaPriem, Richard L.Ndofor, Hermann AchidiTrahms, Cheryl A.2017-12-142017-12-142017-11Goranova, M. L., Priem, R. L., Ndofor, H. A., & Trahms, C. A. (2017). Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness. Strategic Management Journal, 38(11), 2285–2297. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2648https://hdl.handle.net/1805/14827Research summary: We investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double-edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value-destroying M&A deals and value-creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains.enPublisher Policycorporate governanceM&A performance extremenessmonitoringArticle